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1.  Introduction
Central bank independence is an old idea whose support waxes and wanes.
Interest in the issue has recently revived strongly, especially after Rogoff's (1985)
formal technical treatment of the inflation bias and excessive policy volatility  that
result if monetary authorities have a short time horizon (high discount rate) or are
exposed  to political influences.  Many researchers have since extolled the virtues
of an independent central bank (henceforth ICB)  in a crescendo of papers, both
theoretical and empirical.
In the words of Alesina and Summers (  993, p. 151), "[d]elegating monetary
policy to an agent whose preferences are more inflation averse than are society's
preferences serves as a commitment device that permits sustaining a lower rate of
inflation than would otherwise be possible."  According to this view,  a central
bank that is subordinated to the government cannot credibly commit to price
stability as the public will be aware of the dynamic inconsistency of its
announcements and actions.  Furthermore, it is argued that an independent
monetary policy can create incentives for,  or might even force, greater fiscal
discipline on the part of the government.'
The institution of an ICB can be accompanied by the legal formalization of
limits on the monetization of government expenditures and of a set of narrow
central bank policy objectives (i.e., price stability) or monetary rules.  Whili  these- 2  -
can help further establish commitment and credibility, they are collateral to the
purely institutional issue of whether the central bank should report to the
government -- i.e., to the issue of central bank independence in the narrow sense.
The view put forth in this paper is not so much that the advantages of an ICB
have been over-stressed as much as that  its drawbacks and implementation
problems have been overlooked.  At the same time, empirical tests which are
purported to support the central bank independence proposition are plagued by
potential problems of simultaneity, reverse causality, missing variables and
measurement  errors.  Thus, the widely reported simple correlation results are
consistent with  many potential explanations that  do not warrant the independence
of the central bank as a policy prescription.  This paper does not intend to make a
broad case against  central bank independence.  Rather, it merely seeks to put
commonly touted arguments and empirical results in perspective.
While the expansive literature on central bank independence does contain
some criticisms to the ICB quasi-paradigm, few  (if any) critical analyses have been
undertaken between Friedman (1  959,  1962) and Posen (1994).  This paper
extends Posen's analysis to developing countries and discusses more broadly and
systematically the reasons why the mere institution of an ICB may not bring about
its professed benefits.
Some believe that  countries get the inflation rate they really want.
Accordingly, Section 2 takes a political view and discusses how a country's
inflation record and central bank institutional arrangement are both shaped in part-3-
by political  forces bearing  on government. Others  believe  that governments  get
the inflation  rate they deserve. Section  3, then, extends  this logic by looking  at
central  bank-government  relations. It focuses  in particular  on: (i) the potential  for
conflict between  monetary  and  fiscal policy, {ii) the scope  for an ICB's  exercise  of
a truly independent  monetary  policy, and (iii) how these  factors shape  their
institutional  relationship. Sections  2 and 3 both suggest  a number  of reasons  why
low inflation and central bank  independence  are likely to be correlated  though not
necessarily  directly causally  related  to each  other. This is more than of statistical
interest: one cannot make  positive  recommendations  about legal  or institutional
arrangements  for the central  bank if causality  is not established. Section 4
summarizes  the factors that might explain  the observed  statistical correlation
between  inflation and central  bank independence,  and reviews  the statistical
evidence. Section  5 discusses  the institutional  design  problems  of setting up an
ICB,  and in particular  issues  associated  with accountability,  governance  and
operation. Even  if central  bank independence  is fitting on normative  grounds,  it
might not be desirable  if there aren't appropriate  mechanisms  to institutionalize  it.
This paper  supports Banaian,  Laney  and Willett's (1  983) observation  that the
benefits  of central  bank independence  are less likely  to obtain in less developed
countries  (LDCs)  with shallow  financial markets. Perhaps  this explains  why
researchers  have been  so sympathetic  to central  bank  independence:  empirical
analyses  have  tended to focus on OECD  countries,  and theoretical  discussions
have  implicitly assumed  the presence  of deep  financial  markets. But clearly  the-4-
desirability of granting central bank independence  in LDCs should be examined by
looking at their inherent characteristics rather than merely as an extension of what
seems to work in successful OECD  countries.  This paper suggests that central
bank independence should be granted at a later stage in a country's  financial
sector development.  This is counter to the experience in Latin America and to
some extent in Eastern Europe over the last five years where some central banks
have been given wide autonomy from at a relatively early stage of their financial
sector reforms (e.g., Colombia and Venezuela in 1992, and Mexico in April  1994).2
Furthermore, if an LDC seeks to establish a low-inflation path it should concentrate
on instituting financial policy reforms (e.g., liberalization and privatization) that
bolster opposition to inflation rather than easily reversible and practically
meaningless changes in legal and institutional structures.  This will better ensure
the sustainability -and  hence, credibility-- of the government's anti-inflation
stance.
This paper looks at the desirability of instituting central bank independence on
narrow macropolicy grounds, but there might be other relevant considerations.
For instance, granting central bank independence at an early stage of
implementation of sweeping financial reforms as in Colombia, Venezuela and
Mexico may serve to secure credibility in the continuity and sustainability of the
reforms - independently of whether it also yields superior monetary and fiscal
policy outcomes.
Granting independence  to the central bank essentially represents elevatingmonetary policy to a more consecrated level, beyond the fray of politics.  In LDCs,
however, fiscal policy is more deserving of special protection from politics because
of fiscal dominance over monetary policy and the greater vulnerability of fiscal
policy to private interests.  For the sake of argument, Section 6 puts forth a
proposal for an independent fiscal board (IFB), analogous to the more widespread
ICB proposal.  The relative conceptual and practical difficulties in implementing an
IFB paradoxically help explain why the concept of central bank independence has
received such wide support.
2.  The politics  of inflation  and central bank  independence
Goodman (1991) and Posen (1994) argue that the staunchest political
constituency for low inflation is constituted by (private) banks.  Banks' balance
sheet structure (maturity mismatching of assets and liabilities and non-marketable
nature of assets) render them particularly vulnerable to inflation.  Drawing their
political power from the fact that they act as an outside source of information and
advice about monetary conditions, banks are in a position to lobby for anti-
inflationary policies -- including granting independence to the central bank.  Thus,
effective financial sector opposition to inflation (henceforth FOI)  will induce both
low inflation and central bank independence,  without  the latter two  having a
causal relationship.
Similarly, opposition to inflation can arise from ingrained historical or
sociological circumstances, which tends to broaden the constituency opposing
inflation beyond the financial system.  For instance, Swinburne and Castello--6-
Branco (1991) and Cukierman (1992) argue that the West German authorities'
political will to not interfere with monetary policy (as institutionalized in the
Bundesbank's independence)  and their strong preference for low inflation may
both stem from the collective memory of Germany's aberrant inflation record in
the inter-war period.
Posen's framework can be used to understand why FOI has been typically
very weak in LDCs through the 1  980s -- and consequently why they have tended
to have higher inflation rates and a low degree of central bank independence.
First, the small size of the financial system relative to GDP  reduces banks' clout.
There is a dynamic compounding effect as higher inflation in turn further erodes
FOI because of disintermediation (smaller power base) and increasing currency
substitution, widespread indexation to inflation and shortening of loan maturities
(weaker intensity of interest in opposing inflation).
Second, central banks' extensive regulation of banking activities and interest
rates in LDCs through the 1980s has tended to dilute FOI as banks concentrated
their political capital on opposing (or altering) regulations and adopted a more
confrontational stance with the central bank.  Public ownership of banks has been
another common intervention mechanism  for  LDC  governments in the financial
system, which further dampened FOI.
Central banks in LDCs are often forced to intervene directly in the credit
allocation process even if they do not wish a priori to intervene in resource
allocation.  In LDCs  the.central bank often cannot effect monetary policy through-7-
indirect instruments due to the absence  of deep government debt markets and the
scarcity of reliable information on monetary conditions.  Instead, they must often
resort to outright credit restrictions for monetary control purposes, sometimes at
the bank-by-bank level.  The direct nature of these instruments makes banks'
lobbying efforts individualistic (securing a larger share of aggregate credit) rather
than cooperative (ensuring a reasonable  monetary policy).  FOI vanishes in this
environment as credit restraint by the central bank is desired by banks jointly  but
not individually.
Third, developmentalist LDC governments following the import substitution
industrialization strategy prevalent through the 1  980s were more attuned to the
interests of workers, farmers and manufacturers.  Goodman  argues that these
interests favor a less restrictive monetary policy, and countera':t FOl.  Moreover,
Cukierman argues that governments' preferences for fast growth and low interest
rates led the (dependent) LDC  central banks to take on the role of development
banks.  This rendered central banks easily capturable by such interests.
These two  latter factors are mutually reinforcing.  In LDCs, private banks very
often form part of financial groups or conglomerates which are dominated by the
industrial enterprises to a larger degree than in Germany or Japan.  In a highly
regulated financial environment and in the absence of well-functioning  securities
markets, related banks tend to act merely as conduits for inter-enterprise transfers
and to gain access to cheap resources (due to subsidized government credit,
controlled interest rates or preferential allocation of foreign exchange).  Banks do-8
not play the central coordinating, governance and credit allocation functions for
the group that is typical of universal banking arrangements in developed countries.
Because  of their very limited role, banks become subservient to industrial interests
within  their group, which tends to mitigate the intensity of their F01.
Furthermore, in some instances financial institutions may support rather than
oppose higher inflation.  The cleansing effects of inflation may be welcome by
banks that are carrying large losses in their books.  In the extreme, if the banking
system is technically insolvent --which has happened at some point in virtually all
Latin American countries in the 1  980s--, banks become net debtors and may be
positively exposed to inflation.  Also, in LDCs with high inflation rates, banks
neglect traditional lending in favor of exchange rate and real estate speculation.
This business shift is particularly acute in LDCs where bankers are well connected
with government officials and have access to privileged information on impending
policy actions.  Persistent high inflation erodes FOI as banks develop a modus
vivendi suitable to the new environment.
Finally, LDCs typically have a highly centralized government decision-making
structure and often have fractionalized political parties (or factionalized single
ruling parties).  Posen argues that under these circumstances, FOI --or any other
form of outside special interests-- is less likely to have a lasting impact.  Political
fragmentation and frequent government turnover reduces banks' incentives to
"invest'  in FOI.  Goodman, on the other hand, argues that the prospect for
political change is necessary for a government to consent to --or to insist on---9-
granting  independence  to the central  bank  as a way of tying the hands  of the
successor  government.
The  two views can be reconciled  by arguing  that, while the expectation  of
imminent  political change  enhances  the prospects  for obtaining central  bank
independence,  political instability (i.e., the expectation  of continued  changes  in
government)  hinders  it.  Political  Instability  reduces  the effectiveness  of FOI,  as
well as the benefits  associated  with central  bank independence  because  of its
apparent  reversibility. 3 At the same  time, there Is a relation between  political
instability and inflation as documented  by Cukierman,  Edwards  and  Tabellini
(1  992).  Thus, political instability is likely to be associated  with --and even induce--
both higher inflation and the lack of central  bank independence.
Cukierman,  Webb and Neyapti  (1  992) point out that reverse  causality
between  inflation and central bank independence  can also exist to the extent  that
low inflation  tends to make  the central bank  more reputable  (whether  or not fiscal
policy was conducive  to such an outcome),  which in turn allows the central  bank
to seek greater  autonomy. This will happen  even if the political interests  and
effectiveness  of groups  outside  government  remain  constant, but the reputation  of
the central  bank and the strength of FOI  are likely to work together as a reputable
central bank  can more effectively use outside  support to further its policy and
operational  autonomy  goals.
As a corollary, countries  that face greater  macro volatility will have central
banks  with a more  tarnished  image,  which will undermine  their efforts to become- 10  -
independent. The implication  is that LDCs  with greater  vulnerability to external
financial or terms of trade shocks (and  with fewer policy instruments  to deal with
them) are less likely to have an independent  central  bank.
Summing up, the implication of Posen's view that interests  rather than
institutions  matter is that  in LDCs where FOI is weak, granting central bank
independence  will not per se  achieve  the price stability objective. Instead,
reformers  should emphasize  financial  policies that generate  greater FOI  such as
financial  deregulation  and privatization  -- which will in turn deliver lower inflation
along  with central bank independence. Indeed,  the increasing  tendency for central
bank independence  in Latin America  is occurring at the time of drastic liberalization
of their financial  markets. 4 In Asia, where financial markets are being  liberalized
much more slowly, central banks  remain  under the purview of governments.
3.  Potential  policy conflicts:  the good and  the bad
The second set of arguments  that undermine  the case for central bank
independence  revolves  around the policy conflicts that may arise  between the
government  (fiscal policy) and the ICB (mor.letary  policy). The conflicts can either
be passive  (stemming from an unclear division of responsibilities) or active (as
each  engages  in strategic behavior  in order to force actions by the other), and can
arise in the areas  of debt management  and financing of fiscal deficits, exchange
rate management,  and policies  to preserve  banking  stability.  Each of these areas
are reviewed  below.
It should be noted that conflict per se  need not be economically  harmful. In- 11  -
fact,  it is precisely through this latent or potential conflict  that  ICBs are supposed
to keep the government's  .scal  policies in check.  However, conflict  can be
deleterious if it impairs policy accountability  of any or all parts of government or if
lack of monetary and fiscal policy coordination lead to a sub-optimal choice of
policy instruments.  In either case, policy inconsistencies can undermine the
policy commitment that  central bank independence is supposed to signal.  Formal
modelling treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper; instead,
some examples are provided to illustrate these types of conflicts.
Friedman (1959,  1962) argues that,  as long as the central bank does not
retain public debt management powers, central bank independence makes it harder
to determine who is responsible for monetary accommodation of fiscal deficits.  As
a result, it can actually induce an erosion of fiscal  discipline.  He notes that  "open-
market operations and debt management are different names for the same
monetary tool, wielded in one case by the [central  bank] and in the other by the
Treasury"  (Friedman, 1959,  p. 52).  These two  types of policies cannot be
evaluated independently of each other, and in fact  a clear picture of government
policy can only be obtained by consolidating the accounts of the central bank and
the Treasury.
Consider the case of a government sustaining large fiscal deficits  which the
ICB is reluctant to monetize.  In an LDC with  shallow capital markets and limited
access to foreign savings, substantial domestic debt financing of deficits might
induce inordinately high real interest rates and crowd  out credit to the private- 12  -
sector.  By claiming  that these are monetary  problems,  the government  might be
able  to shift pnoitical  responsibility  for its fiscal actions  to the ICB. Hetzel (1990)
describes  similar instances  when the Federal  Reserve  Bank in the U.S. was
'"scapegoated"  for the prevailing  higjh  interest rates.
Even  where the central bank enjoys no autonomy,  the government  often still
tries to shift responsibility  for its fiscal actions  to the central bank.  The large
quasi-fiscal  deficits of Latin American  central  banks  through the 1  980s attest to
that: by shifting deficits to the central bank,  the government  could present
reasonably  balanced  books to.  the legislature  and the public. But it is clear that
incentives  for seeking  to shift responsibility  for the consequences  of its fiscal
actions to the central bank  are even greater  if there is an arms-length  relationship
with the central bank  as it provides  for a more effective political shield.
While an ICB  with a clear low inflation mandate  enhances  accountability  in
terms of the narrow inflation goal, it may result in an unclear  assignment  of
responsibilities  (and hence  reduced  accountability)  in terms of other relevant
economic  objectives (e.g., real interest rates or credit availability to the private
sector).  If the public evaluates  the performance  of the central bank -and hence
the credibility of its commitment- on the basis  of such quantities, the central bank
should care about them even if its narrow objective  function only specifies  the
attainment  of price  stability.  After studying the behavior  of six developed-country
central banks, Bernanke  and Mishkin (1992) conclude  that central bankers  pursue
multiple  economic objectives  even if they have a narrow anti-inflation mandate,- 13  -
and, further, that their attention is focused at any given time on the variable  that is
currently "in crisis" to the neglect  of other concerns.
This opens  the possibility  for the ICB  and the government  to engage  in games
of "chicken" whereby one's actions are undertaken  at least in part to force actions
on or elicit reactions by the other.  The two will behave  strategically, and the
degree  of cooperation  will be determined  endogenously  by reputation (of the
individuals  as much as of the institutions involved)  and by observed  behavior  in
previous  repetitions  of the game. Alesina (1988) describes  a situation where the
government  may pursue  an overly expansionary  fiscal policy to test how willing
the central bank is to persist  with an unaccommodative  monetary  stance; and,
conversely,  the central  bank may respond  with an overly restrictive monetary
policy to establish  toughness  and to force the government  to change  policy.  Such
games  can induce suboptimal  outcomes (Alesina,  1989).
These potential policy conflicts presuppose  that there is scope for an
independent  monetary  policy.  The limiting case  is where the size of the financial
system is so small relative  to budget deficits that the central bank has no choice
but to monetize  deficits.  In the original  Sargent  and Wallace (1  981) model, fiscal
dominance  occurs because  fiscal policy is assumed  to be set exogenously  to
monetary  policy and there is a limit to the amount of government  debt that can be
held by the public (no Ponzi  condition); satisfying the inter-temporal  budget
constraint means  that sooner or later budget deficits have to be monetized.
Consider  the previous example,  where an unrepentant  profligate government- 14  -
clashes with  a central bank that refuses to monetize deficits.  The credit crunch
and the appreciation of the currency induced by massive debt-financed fiscal
deficits might prove so deflationary as to make room for a monetary expansion by
the central bank --thereby accommodating fiscal  deficits ex post.5 If the central
bank recognizes this from the outset, it might  prefer to accommodate the deficits
monetarily in the first place.
Burdekin and Laney (1988) review the empirical literature on the causality
(i.e., extent of dominance) of monetary and fiscal policy in developed countries.
They themselves take the approach of estimating reaction functions for the
government and rentral  bank simultaneously, with  endogenous inflation.  Their
results for developed countries show two-way  causality, i.e., no dominance.
One of the factors  that induces fiscal dominance is the central bank's lack of
suitable instruments of monetary control.  This will  be the case in LDCs where
government securities markets are aliquot, the central bank does not hold
sufficient  amounts of tradable securities, and its regulatory and supervisory
powers over banks are inadequate to enforce direct quantitative  credit  restrictions.
If fiscal dominance applies, that is, if a country's  economic policy is only as
good as its fiscal policy, the anti-inflation  stance of the ICB will not be credible
(Swinburne and Castello-Branco).  Institutional  central bank independence does not
translate into independence of monetary policy  - in which  case the central bank
will not be up to its anti-inflation task.'
These potential conflicts have implications not only on the effectiveness of- 15  -
central bank independence  once it is instituted, but also on the likelihood  of
observing  such independence  in the first place. The central bank is likely to be
more independent  where the government  follows a conservative  fiscal policy as
there will be less of a chance  of the kinds of conflicts between  monetary  and fiscal
policies  described  above  to emerge. A government  that attaches  less value to
controlling the printing press is more likely to grant independence  to the central
bank. As Cukierman  (1992) points out, LDC  governments  with more unstable
fiscal revenues  (and  hence higher inflation volatility) are more likely  to value the
option of having recourse  to seignorage. In this case, the observed  correlation
between  inflation and central bank independence  may be due to the fact that both
these  factors are themselves  correlated  with the government's  fiscal stance.
Along the same lines, the size of the government  might be related to both
central bank independence  and inflation.  Alesina (1988) reports a positive
correlation  between  the share of government  expenditures  in GDP  and inflation.  It
is likely also that smaller  budgets (controlling  for the level of development)  reflect
a less intrusive philosophy  of government,  which should be sympathetic with
central bank independence.
Likewise,  the reputation  of the central bank --and, hence,  the degree  of
central bank independence--  will depend  not only on the inflation record but also
on the central bank's scope for undertaking  an independent  monetary  policy.
Where  the central bank does not have powerful instruments  of monetary  control it
is less likely to be independent  as it will not serve as a strong commitment  device.- 16  -
Policy conflicts  can also arise with  respect to exchange rate policy.  In no
country  has exchange rate policy been turned over entirely to the central bank
(Swinburne and Casteilo-Branco, 1991).  Moreover, actions by both the
government and the ICB will affect exchange rate determination  even if the narrow
role of exchange rate regulation and intervention is specifically assigned to one of
them.  Goodhart  1  994) comments that  proponents of central bank independence
invariably support a price stability  mandate for the ICB without  first questioning
whether monetary policy should be geared towards  preserving the stability  of the
external, rather than internal, value of the currency.  But the reality is that  if the
ICB is to be only charged with maintaining price stability the government must be
prepared to relinquish other objectives of exchange rate policy.  In their study of
six developed-country central banks, Bernanke and Mishkin (1992)  observed that
in all countries the central bank modified its policy at some point in time to arrest
what they  considered to be an undesirable exchange rate trend.
Suppose for instance that,  in the face of large foreign capital inflows,  the
government chooses to let the exchange rate float.  In the absence of foreign
exchange intervention, the induced appreciation of the exchange rate makes room
for a non-inflationary monetary expansion by the ICB.  This action  by the central
bank undermines the government's  policy of letting the exchange rate appreciate.
Conflict can be expected when the government and the ICB can both affect the
exchange rate analogously but have different  objective functions.
The need for coordination is even more important under fixed or managed- 17  -
floating exchange rate regimes.  In fact,  it could be argued that  central bank
independence becomes relatively less meaningful under such regimes as monetary
policy is bound by objectives other than price stability.  This suggests that LDCs,
which tend to belong to currency blocks, are less likely to have an independent
central bank.
A third channel through which  monetary policy might be either conflictive
with  or subservient to the government's  wider economic policies is through their
impact on the banking system.  If the central bank has lender of last resort, bank
supervisory or deposit insurance functions,  it may face a tradeoff  between its
monetary and institutional  stability  objectives.  As suggested by Grilli, Masciandaro
and Tabellini (1991), the government can force the central bank to react to
(accommodate) the government's  policies if these might jeopardize banking
stability.  Large fiscal deficits  which,  because the central bank is unwilling to
finance them, generate an unsustainable path of domestic or foreign  debt might
trigger a flight  to cash.  In order to prevent this (i.e., to avoid having to act as
lender of last resort), the central bank might have to accept some monetization of
the debt.  Swinburne and Castello-Branco (1991) further  argue that  any bank
supervisory duties by the central bank will  expose it to political pressures to act --
or not act-- in specific  circumstances.  These pressures operate at the institutional
level but might condition monetary policy - and hence might  undermine the
central bank's credibility of commitment.
To sum up, conflicts  can arise between autonomous monetary and fiscal- 18 -
policies  in relation to their impact on: (i) public debt management  and domestic
credit conditions; (ii) exchange  rate policy; and (iii) institutional  stability of the
financial  sector.  ICBs  will not generate  any credibility in economic  policies if --as
is likely to be the case in LDCs--  the country faces fiscal dominance,  the banking
system  is in a precarious  financial condition, or if there are no clear mechanisms  to
resolve  conflicts between  monetary  and fiscal policies. If this is the case, at best
the credibility gains associated  with an ICB might not accrue; at worst, such
conflicts might lead to an inferior policy outcome than under less disciplined,  but
more coordinated,  economic management.
These  potential policy conflicts are likely to be aggravated  in practice by the
difficulty of securing true political independence  for the central bank, which is
further discussed  in Section 5.  If, as is often the case, the degree  of
independence  is murky and institutional relations  are dominated  by personal
interactions,  conflicts will arise at many other levels. Strategic behavior  of the
government  and the ICB  will entail not only choice of policies  but also political
arm-twisting and back-door  negotiations.
4.  The correlation  between  inflation  and central  bank  independence
The two preceding  sections have provided  abundant  theoretical reasons  why
the observed  negative  correlation  between  inflation and central bank independence
does not in and of itself  provide prima  facie  support for central bank autonomy.
The correlation  may be spurious (due  to omitted variables)  or reflect reverse or
two-way causality. This is because  low inflation and central bank independence  is- 19  -
likely to observed  in countries with: (i) a solid political constituency opposing
inflation; (ii) a more stable and conducive  political system; (iii) a more reputable
central bank; and (iv) a conservative  fiscal policy and responsible  government.
While the possibility of alternative causality relationships  and simultaneity biases
have been  widely acknowledged  in the literature, it has not received adequate
attention at either a conceptual  or empirical  level.
The implications  are two-fold.  First, the lack of independence  of central
banks  in LDCs  should not be interpreted  systematically  as demonstrating  LDC
governments'  preference  for higher inflation.  Sections 2 and 3 have reviewed  the
many political economy reasons  why the central bank is less likely to be
independent  in LDCs  than in more developed  countries. Second, positive
recommendations  on central bank institutional arrangements  cannot be made  if
causality  relations are not well established.
At a purely statistical level, the negative  correlation between  inflation and
central  bank independence  is well established  for developed  countries.'  Even  that
is less ciear in LDCs. Cukierman,  Webb and Neyapti (1992) have devised  the
most comprehensive  set of characteristics  purported  to signify central bank
independence,  and were the first (and  only ones)  to test the central bank
independence  proposition on LDCs. They report that, for LDCs  alone,  the standard
indices  of legal/institutional  central bank independence  are not correlated  with
inflation.  On this basis  they argue  that in LDCs  statutory measures  are not
relevant  since the practice is often more important than the law.  While this might- 20  -
be the case, Walsh (1993)  correctly  notes that there is a problem with  using the
correlation between central bank independence and inflation to test  both the
effectiveness of central bank independence and the appropriateness of different
measures of central bank independence.
Standard dejure  indices of central bank independence have the added
problem of combining measures of legal or institutional independence-(e.g.,
mechanisms for appointment  and dismissal of central bank officials,  and control
over budgetary resources of the ICB) with  measures  of the degree to which central
bank exerts discretion in setting  monetary policy (e.g., precision in the definition of
.central  bank objectives,  and the legal stipulation  of limitations on government
borrowing from the central bank).'  While the two  need not go together
conceptually, a rules-based ICB is much more likely to preserve its independent
stance in practice and is likely to achieve the policy credibility  it is designed for.
Such studies test the central bank independence and rules-versus-discretion
propositions jointly.
It is commonly acknowledged  in the literature that the degree of central bank
independence is more a product  of informal implicit  agreements, tradition  and
personalities, and hence de  facto  independence (whether or not it is legally
sanctioned) is increasingly being stressed.  In this case, the problems of
endogeneity, multiple causal directionality  and measurement errors are even more
pervasive and less tractable.  Operational de facto  independence is the product of
day-to-day political, institutional  and personal interactions and implicit- 21  -
negotiations, and hence is very much shaped by prevailing attitudes,  political
power structures and economic outcomes, all of which themselves have a direct
bearing on inflation.  On the other hand, time series variation in indicators of de
jure independence are much less sensitive to such contemporaneous economic and
political conditions.
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti use the turnover rate of central bank
governors as a measure of actual central bank independence on the grounds that
dependent central bank governors are likely to be replaced more frequently.  Using
this measure they do find a negative correlation between independence and
inflation for LDCs. There are several reasons why this might not be a good proxy
for actual independence. First, as they themselves acknowledge, a relatively
subservient governor will tend to stay longer and survive different governments
despite their lack of autonomy.  Second, as Walsh notes, high inflation might be
viewed as an indication of failed central bank policies on the part of an
independent (and, hence, presumably directly responsible) central bank governor.
Thus, resignation of the top central banker might be expected following  an
inflationary bout --indeed, might be desirable especially if the central bank is
independent. Third, central bank governor turnover probably reflects specific
attempts by the government to encroach on central bank independence -- i.e.,
instances in which the government is using non-statutory methods or the threat of
legal changes to enhance its influence on monetary policy.  The turnover rate
depends on both the absolute level of independence and the divergence of- 22  -
monetary  and fiscal policies (i.e., the potential  for conflict).  Therefore, the
measure  may be driven to a large  extent by the government's  fiscal stance,.  i.e., it
selects  in relatively  fiscally irresponsible  governments. If this is the case, ttre
correlation  of central  bank governor  turnover and Inflation might just mimic the
.correlation between  fiscal policy and inflation, and hence  exaggerates  the effect of
central  bank independence  on inflation.  Fourth, this measure  can be expected to
be correlated  with political instability -- i.e., the rate of turnover of governments,
not just central  bankers. A central bank that depends  from a stable government
would experience  low turnover.
Cukierman,  Kalaitzidakis,  Summers  and Webb (1993) and Cukierman  and
Webb, 1  994) refine  the turnover measure  by normalizing  for the frequency of
government  changes  (political instability) and by restricting attention to the six
months following a political transition (when changes  in central  bank governorship
are  presumed  to be strictly politically induced). This measure  of central bank
independence  reflects: (i) the length of the governor's term; lii) whether or not the
governor's  term is staggered  with the government's;  and (iii) the frequency of
governor  replacements  during the course of his term.  The first two are strictly
legal  parameters  (which jointly determine  the probability that ce.ntral  bank governor
and government  turnover will coincide)  and only the third can be construed to
reflect extra-legal  control of the central bank. Thus, contrary to the authors'
claims,  this measure  captures a mixture of de  jure and de facto central bank
independence.- 23  -
Restricting attention  to periods around political transitions  has both
advantages and disadvantages.  The first three criticisms  listed above for turnover
rates will  still apply, but much mitigated.-  It will still be the case that  a governor
that  has proved to be particularly malleable In the past will be less likely to be
replaced after a transition,  and that systematic replacement of the governor
reflects an incoming government whose profligate fiscal policy can be expected to
clash with  the central bank.  Given the higher central bank governor turnover  in
LDCs, this variable to a large extent replicates an LDC dummy -- and may show up
statistically in their regressions for this reason.  On the other hand, this index will
only capture part of the relationship between government and central bank as it
focuses only on political transitions.
To sum up, going beyond the simple correlation result  and testing the
causality of central bank independence is remarkably difficult.  Quantifying  central
bank independence involves problems of both definition  (listing the inherent
characteristics of central bank independence) and measurement (potential lack of
observability of these characteristics).  The above discussion shows how the
inherent arbitrariness of numerical indices of central bank independence (which
can be based on a variety of legal, institutional and observed behavioral
characteristics) further  strains causality relationships.  The only avenue left to
minimize these problems is, following  the example of Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis,
Summers and Webb, to narrow  down the definition  of independence, at the cost
of only getting a partial picture.- 24  -
Econometric  cross-country analyses  are also hazardous  because potential
instruments and factors that one would need to control for (e.g., political stability,
government fiscal policy stance, deepness  of financial sector and financial
condition of the banking system) can be construed to be themselves correlated
with both inflation and central bank independence  for reasons  described in the two
preceding sections.  This translates into a lack of robustness to alternative
specifications of current econometric tests of the independence  proposition. 9
Granger  causality tests are also marred by the lack of historical variation in indices
of central bank independence  derived from legal or institutional factors.10
Unfortunately, Sections 2 and 3 show that, even if causality and simultaneity
problems  were satisfactorily dealt with through two-stage least squares or system
estimation, the problem of omitted variables (which give rise to spurious
correlations) would remain to be addressed. A convincing test of the central bank
independenc;e  proposition cannot be undertaken in the absence  of a
comprehens.ive  macroeconomic, political and institutional model, which is beyond
the current state of theory.
5.  ICB  design  issues: accountability  and governance
Another set of issues that throws into question the desirability of granting
independence  to the central bank relates to the difficulty of designing an
institutional arrangement for the ICB  that ensures its independence  from the
government while still preserving its accountability to the public and its anti-
inflation bias.  Swinburne and Castello-Branco  (1991) stress the importance of the- 25  -
institutional framework given that the incentives operating on the ICB can be
crucial in building the sought after policy credibility.  The key legal/institutional
aspects are: (i) the mechanisms for appointment and composition of the central
bank board; (ii) the degree of democratic control over and public accountability of
the ICB; (iii) incentive structures (if any) for the ICB's board and management; and
(iv) control over the ICB's budgetary resources.
The benefits of the ICB are premised on its officials being "more conservative
than the general population," but their proponents are silent on how to ensure this
institutionally.  No country has implemented  --or even proposed-- a separate, direct
democratic system to appoint their top central banker(s), and hence the task is
generally left to the government (most often with the acquiescence  of the
legislature, and som.letimes  with some minority representation from banks).  The
question remains: if the government is not trusted to run a conservative monetary
policy, why should it be trusted to (more or less directly) appoint conservative
central bankers?
Goodman (1991) implies that the "conservative ethos" of central bankers
should produce the desired outcome.  To the extent that this ethes stems from
central bankers' intimate relation with the financial system (i.e., exposure to FOI,
to use Posen's terminology), it cannot be relied upon in LDCs given their generally
weaker FOI as contended in Section 2.  Moreover, if countries rely on FOI alone to
ensure the conservativeness of its central bankers the result will be that central
bankers' preferences will be least different from society's precisely when societal- 26  -
aversion to inflation is weak.  An ICB will work least well when it is most needed.
It might also be argued that (sparring) high-profile appointments of prominent
central bank officials, unlike day-to-day monetary policy decisions, generate
sufficient scrutiny by the public to ensure that the government "does the right
thing."  This is a naive view as it assumes  that the public can be distracted and
fooled when decisions are broken into smaller pieces.  In any case, it is a leap of
faith to believe that government will not be inclined to appoint a central bank
board that has a discount rate (or decision-making  time horizon) similar to its own.
The fundamental problem is that institutional mechanisms currently in place
for ICBs  are not consistent with their objectives, as they do not solve the dynamic
inconsistency problem.  If the government is not bound in any way on the
appointment of future ICB board members, society can judge the
"--conservativeness"  of the current board of the ICB but not that of future  boards.
The government can "tie its hands" (i.e.,  credibly commit to a low-inflation policy
stance) only for the duration of the current board of the ICB.  It gains no policy
credibility thereafter, and hence is subject to time inconsistency for any period of
time longer than the average duration of a board.  Consequently, an ICB merely
lengthens  the unit of time over which time inconsistency may arise --from the
normal daily monetary policy decision-making horizon to the average duration of
the board.  If the duration of the ICB board is longer than the period between
elections, this arrangement does insulate monetary policy from the electoral cycle.
However, it does little to eliminate broader political business cycles associated- 27  -
with multiple terms and partisan politics.
The practical solution found in many countries is to lengthen the term of
central bank board members  in an attempt to stretch the "commitment horizon."
Two caveats are in order.  First, the (otherwise desirable)  practice of staggering
appointments actually has the effect of reducing the average  term of the board  --
i.e., the time it takes to appoint a new board majority.  If board members are
appointed for 14 years as in the US  --clearly a long time by any standard--, the
average remaining term for its board members  is only seven years -- hardly
reassuring  for holders of thirty year bonds. 11 Second, there is a clear conflict
between "buying"  credibility by prolonging board terms and securing
accountability for the board, which is discussed below.
To sum up, the conceptually strong arguments for independence of the
central bank have not been backed up by appropriate mechanisms  for appointing
central bankers that ensure that in the future central bankers will be more anti-
inflationary than the government.  In practice, future credibility is secured by
fostering the development of a strong FOI, investing in central bank reputation and
lengthening board appointments.  These are poor substitutes as they will work
successfully only under ICB-friendly environments --when the ICB is least needed--,
and in the latter case aggravates ICB  accountability problems.
A related issue is the accountability or governance of the central bank board
once it is appointed.  ICB boards cannot be accountable  to the public at large as
they are not appointed democratically, and cannot report to the government as- 28  -
this would violate its independence. Instead, proponents of central bank
independence  visualize the ICB as operating on a par with the executive, legislative
and judiciary branches of government, its powers derived from some kind of
"monetary constitution" -- a broad declaration of policy objectives.  However,
none has been proposed that narrowly specifies what constitutes non-compliance
with targets or objectives, or that lays out corrective or punitive action in the
event of non-compliance.  Hence, a broad monetary constitution represents a
weak, almost purely moral, form of accountability.
In practice, most countries with an ICB rely on central bankers' reputation as
a control device on their actions.  The problem is that reputational accountability
would work least well precisely when it is needed  the most: in countries where
government has appointed less conservative central bankers, where there is a
small pool of talented and reputable individuals to draw on for the central bank
board, or where the ICB is operating in a difficult  policy environment -
circumstances  which are more likely to arise in LDCs. Accountability is particularly
important for a fledgling ICB as it would be critical to secure the sought-after
policy credibility, to develop reputation, and to compensate  for the erosion of the
democratic principle.
Friedman  (11962)  questions the wisdom of concentrating so much power in a
body free of any kind of direct, effective political control.  He suggests that a
superior arrangement would be to secure legislative (rather than executive) control
over the central bank; the legislature  would approve the central bank's (multi-year)- 29  -
operating monetary rules, and the central bank would carry them out.  The
legislature would be in charge of "fleshing out"  and overseeing  the implementation
of the ICB's monetary constitution.  In practice, only a few countries have adopted
a fully rules-based monetary policy with the constitution of a currency board.
Bernanke  and Mishkin (1992) observe  that even "hardline" developed-country
central banks never adhere to strict, iron-clad rules but may adopt a hybrid of rules
and discretion.  Thus, no major country has circumvented the central bank
accountability issue by adopting monetary rules.
In the absence of explicit control mechanisms, ICB accountability can only be
preserved in the limit by maintaining the possibility of withdrawal of the treasured
independence  from the central bank.  Elected officials' power to bring the central
bank under their control effectively confers democratic legitimacy on the ICB.
Under such a model the government waives, but does not ultimately surrender, its
power over monetary policy.  It is perhaps for this reason that many countries,
including the U.S., maintain a certain degree of ambiguity about the permanence
of the independence  -- what Swinburne and Castello-Branco  refer to as "the
tension between formal independence  and actual, but unacknowledged,
dependence."  In fact,  it is rare to find the independence  of the central bank
enshrined  in national constitutions.  This comes at the price of exposing the
central bank to some degree of potential government interference: as Goodman
points out, in the long run ICBs  remain vulnerable to political threats of losing their
independence. The bottom line is that, under existing institutional arrangements,- 30  -
accountability and legal independence  are at odds, and one can only hope to strike
the right balance between the two.  This game can only be played fruitfully  in
politically stable countries.  It is important to maintain the threat  of revoking
independence  but with a low probability of exercising it.  This accountability
device would not be appropriate in the less politically stable LDCs.
Another device frequently used to mitigate ICBs' lack of democratic
representation  and public accountability is to appoint a diverse ICB board reflecting
broad interests in the economy.  For example, the six lay members  of the Banque
de France's first independent board appointed in January 1994 were drawn from
finance, industry, politics, academics  and journalism.' 2 The problem, again, is that
an ICB board that fairly represents  society's interests is at odds with the idea that
the central bank board should be more conservative than society at large.
A third device --implemented  to date in Canada and New Zealand--  that can
serve to enhance credibility in the face of the lack of public accountability is for
the ICB  to state explicit inflation targets against which its performance can be
measured. Even abstracting altogether from the (as yet theoretically unsettled)
issue of whether inflation is the only economic variable the central bank should
care about, the much touted narrow inflation objective of ICBs is a fuzzier
objective than most would admit, and as such cannot be taken too literally for
operational purposes. Friedman's long and variable lags and gaps in our
knowledge of the monetary transmission mechanism  mean that such operating
rules cannot be relied upon to entirely replace accountability.- 31  -
Inflation can stem from many factors (supply-side  shocks, financial innovation
or other domestic monetary shocks, fiscal and government borrowing policies,
etc.) that are not directly under the control of the central bank.  Setting a
numerical inflation target for the central bank merely creates a perception of
precision  that does not correspond with reality, and does not necessarily provide a
benchmark  for measuring the quality  of monetary policy ex ante.  To the extent
that LDCs  are more vu;herable to monetary shocks (given their smaller size and the
larger volatility of real variables they are exposed to) and have poorer data
availability and quality, such mechanisms are likely to be even less effective in
enhancing credibility.  An inflation target also falls short of providing
accountability in that if the targets are not met there is no feedback or control
mechanism  to ensure that targets will be met in the future.
In addition, New Zealand's ICB has taken the extra step of (indirectly) linking
the bank's budget to the inflation outcome, as the central bank's budget is fixed in
nominal terms for five year periods." 3 While this introduces an incentive for good
performance and helps ensure that monetary targets are met, it does not
constitute --and cannot substitute for-- extemal accountability.
One can explain in this light Friedman's (1962) observation that historically
central banks in developed countries have been given independence  when and
where there was a commodity standard.  The commodity standard represents an
extreme form of explicit monetary policy targeting, serves to curb the influence
and power of the ICB, and effectively supplants public accountability.- 32  -
To sum  up, the issue of ICB accountability has not been resolved
satisfactorily.  The erosion of democratic control over the central bank has not
been replaced with another suitable form of governance.  In practice, democratic
governments have sought to mitigate this problem by investing in central bank
reputation, retaining a certain level of ambiguity about the degree of central bank
independence,  appointing a diverse ICB board that reflects different interests in
society, and by stating explicit ICB policy targets against which their performance
can be measured. However, some of these approaches  in part vitiate the whole
objective of having an ICB.
The third (related) major design issue concerns who controls the [CB's
budget.  It has long been recognized  that if the ICB's budget is not set externally
(as in New Zealand) the central bank has a perverse incentive to inflate in order to
maximize profits (and hence its own expenditures). At best, this undermines
credibility in the ICB's objectives, and aggravates  the accountability and
governance problems discussed above.  At worst, it actually introduces a pro-
inflation bias.
A common argument put forth to support the independence  of central banks
especially  in LDCs is that they typically have a more technically competent,
dedicated  and professionalized  staff than government ministries, and hence
presumably  are more trustworthy  for monetary policy decision-making. While this
is certainly generally the case, the mere fact that central banks have succeeded in
maintaining higher budgetary resources  than other government agencies to pay for- 33  -
this higher quality staff is troubling in and of itself.  It is an indication that  central
banks have largely escaped  the fiscal realities of their respective governments.
Yet any kind of government budgetary control would introduce the potential for
political manipulation of monetary policy.  Friedman's proposal for legislative
control of the central bank solves this issue by making it possible for parliament to
approve the central bank's (multi-year) budget, as is done in New Zealand.
Lastly, it should be stressed that central bank independence  must not only be
recognized legally but also maintained in practice.  Protecting the ICB  from
government interference in its day-to-day operations may be difficult  if, as
Swinburne and Castello-Branco  (1991) argue, non-statutory methods for exerting
influence can be used to undermine the central bank's independence  if the
government is determined to do so.  Cukierman (1992) argues that in LDCs  the
law is applied less literally and that there is less respect for division of authority
between different branches of government.  The role of tradition in shaping inter-
institutional relationships as pointed out by Banaian, Laney and Willett (1983) is
likely to be more important in less legalistic LDC  societies.  The implication is that
ICBs are likely to be much less effective in signalling commitment in LDCs.
In the same spirit, Friedman l1962) argues that one effect of the lack of
accountability over the central bank is that policies (and inter-agency relations) are
highly dependent on personalities.  Thus, the degree of actual central bank
independence  can be expected to change with the personalities involved, even if
the legal and institutional setup is invariant.- 34  -
Securing  true de facto autonomy entails very fundamental changes in the
interactions among politicians, bureaucrats  and institutions.  In addition, in the
words of Goodhart (1994), "independence, once granted, can only be maintained
and effectively utilized by an unrelenting and continuous political and educational
campaign to explain what monetary policy can, and cannot, effectively do."
6.  Concluding  thoughts: an indeDendent  fiscal  board  counterDroDosal
This paper has argued that the purported benefits of an ICB may be eroded by
potential conflicts between fiscal and monetary policy and by deficiencies in their
institutional design (especially  as related to mechanisms  for appointment of the
board, public accountability and control of its budget).  These factors imply that, if
the central bank is granted independence,  the dynamic inconsistency problems
traditionally associated  with monetary policy are not eliminated but merely
transformed. Monetary policy independence  is much more the product of day-to-
day personal interactions than of the legal or institutional framework for central
bank independence. Institutions are shaped by the country's  inflation preferences
and record, and have only a very little bearing on these.  The policy implication for
LDCs is that in order to secure low-inflation the best course of action is to under-
take financial sector reforms that bolster FOI (e.g., liberalization, privatization, and
reduction in credit to the government) rather than on instituting easily reversible
and practically meaningless  changes in their legal/institutional structures.
The independent central bank model offers monetary policy special protection
from the political process.  However, as we have seen, in countries with shallow- 35  -
financial  systems,  monetary  policy is the reverse  side  of the coin of fiscal policy
and  can only play an accommodative  role.  Fiscal  policy  (taken in a broad  sense  to
include  pubic enterprise  expenditures)  is most often  at the root of macro policy
disturbances  in LDCs. Where  this is the case,  the greater  fragility of fiscal policy
to political  interests  should  make  it more meritorious  of mechanisms  that remove  it
from the political  process. An independent  fiscal board (IFB)  could be set up,
analogously  to an independent  central  bank. Its mandate  could be devised  in a
number  of ways.  For  example,  the IFB  would determine  only the size of the
budget  deficit and  the government  would decide  the overall  level and composition
of revenues  and expenditures  subject  to the budget  deficit constraint.' 4
This proposal  represent  a substantial  curtailing  of government  discretion  in
fiscal policy. Relinquishing  authority over fiscal policy is less acceptable  politically
than renouncing  to monetary  policy precisely  because  the micro  implications  and
ramifications  of fiscal policy is the material  politics is made  from.  It is generally
easier  to target benefits  through  fiscal policy. In the extreme,  without
discretionary  fiscal policy, there would not be much  left to government.
Despite  its apparent  stringency,  the IFB  proposal  can be related  to other
proposals  currently  being  discussed. It is equivalent  to an ICB  plus a pre-set  limit
on government  borrowing  from all sources. The balanced  budget  amendment
proposal  in the U.S. is essentially  the IFB  proposal  with the IFB  in addition  waiving
its discretion  to change  the deficit over  time. Thus,  the IFB  proposal  (as  specified
above)  is more  flexible than  the balanced  budget  amendment  proposal  but stricter- 36  -
than the ICB  proposal.
While  an IFB  might be superior  to an ICB  as a way of binding  policy-makers'
actions  and thereby  enhancing  credibillty 9 the political  and operational  problems
seem  more  daunting. It would be difficult to specify an objective  function  for the
IFB  given  the multiplicity  of potential  targets (e.g., annual  GDP  growth rate, long-
term growth, standard  of living, productivity growth, international
competitiveness,  etc.) which may not be fully compatible. There  would also be
greater  difficulty in defining  and measuring  fiscal (rather  than monetary)  flows in a
tamper-proof  manner. Accounting  gimmicks,  loop-holes  and  distortions  are bound
to exploit  any necessarily  arbitrary  set semantic  and  methodological  stipulations.
The IFB  proposal  seems  far-fetched;  but tying the fiscal hands  of
governments  is actually  the role often played  by the IMF  vis A vis LDCs. If we are
going  to make  broad  changes  in the politicallinstitutional  structures  underpinning
economic  policy-making,  it would seem  to make  more  sense  to force discipline  on
fiscal policy directly rather  than indirectly  through monetary  policy.1/  Cukierman  (19921  contains  formal treatment  of the now standard  views on the
advantages  of central  bank independence,  which are  not further reviewed  In this
paper. Persson  (1  9881  has a broader  discussion  of time Inconsistency  and  the role
of credibility  in macroeconomic  policy.
2/  In the case  of Argentina  the authorities  chose  to enhance  monetary  policy
credibility  by establishing  a legally-binding  monetary  rule (requiring  that the
monetary  base  be backed  by foreign reserves)  rather  than by effecting  institutional
changes. Chile  is the one Latin  American  country where  central  bank
independence  was granted  (in 1  989) after the bulk of financial  sector reforms
were  completed.
.a  Cukierman  (1992) offers a somewhat  different  interpretation. He  draws a
distinction  between  party political  instability  (defined  as political  instability  in
countries  with internal  cohesion)  and  regime  political  instability (where  there is no
internal  political  cohesion). He argues  that central  bank  independence  should  be
correlated  positively  with measures  of party  political  instability and  negatively  with
measures  of regime  political  instability. These  labels  seem  inappropriate  as they
seem  to connote  differences  in political  structure  (party  system versus  totalitarian
regimes)  rather  than in degree  of internal  political  cohesion.
4/  Brazil  remains  the only major  Latin  American  country not to have  constrained
the government's  control over  monetary  policy (see  note 1). This is consistent
with Cukierman's  (1992) observation  that widespread  indexation  (as is the case  in
Brazil)  makes  central  bank  independence  less pressing  (i.e., weakens  FOI).
5/  Lago 1 991) provides  a vivid example  of such a process. From  September
1988 to July 1989 the Peruvian  central  bank  --one  of the most independent  in
Latin  America  at the time--  stopped  accommodating  the bulk of the Treasury's
requests  for credit. This induced  a 23% drcmtp  in GDP  and a 75% appreciation  of
the parallel  exchange  rate. The policy ended  with the resignation  of the President
of the central  bank,  which signifies  not so much  that politics  triumphed  over
monetary  policy as much as the utter impossibility  of running  an independent
monetary  policy under  the circumstances.
6/  Casual  support  for the claim  that in Latin  America  monetary  policy is
dominated  by fiscal policy is provided  by the fact that what distinguishes
successful  stabilizations  from unsuccessful  ones  in the region  is that only the
former  addressed  fundamental  fiscal imbalances.  This suggests  that the crises
were fiscal in origin.
7/  Empirical  support for the correlation  between  inflation  and central  bank
independence  has been  provided,  among  others, by Banaian,  Laney  and Willett
(1983),  Alesina (1988)  and Cukierman,  Webb  and Neyapti  (1992). Grilli,Masciandaro and Tabellini 11991  1, Alesina and Summers (1993)  and Cukierman,
Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb (1 993) also look at the correlation of indices of
central bank independence with  a variety of real variables and interest  rates.
A/  Studies that have examined this joint  hypothesis include Goodman (1991) and
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992).  Swinburne and Castello-Branco (1991)
explain why independence and rules-based monetary policy are generally found
(and measured) together.  Hetzel (1990) hypothesizes about the circumstances
under which the two  are more likely to occur simultaneously.
9/  To illustrate the effect of endogenizing such variables as fiscal deficits and
inflation, consider the difference in results between Banaian, Leroy and Willett
(1983) and Burdekin and Laney (1988) on a similar database (comprising
developed countries over roughly 1960-80).  In the former study,  the coefficient
from regressing central bank independence on inflation is negative and significant
at the 1  % confidence level.  In the second study,  inflation, fiscal deficits  and
money growth are endogenized in a system of three equations with  central bank
independence as an independent variable in all three equations.  In this  case all
three coefficients  on central bank independence are negative but not significant at
the 5% confidence level.  It should be mentioned, however, that they  use a very
crude measure of central bank independence (a 0-1 dummy).
101 Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) overcome this problem by using the
turnover rate of central bank governors as a proxy for actual (as opposed to
statutory)  central bank independence.  They exploit the greater historical variation
of the average turnover  rate for each of three decades, and confirm two-way
causality.
111  In fact, the duration of a 30-year Treasury bond is 12.4 years (as of June
1994).  So half the board of the Fed will be replaced almost 57/2  years before  the
bondholder gets half his money back (in present value terms) -- and three Fed
chairmen later (since the chairman is appointed for only four years).  Actually,  the
Fed chairman is very  powerful so that,  effectively  the average commitment
horizon is only two  years.  The newly independent French central bank board also
has a short time  horizon: the three Banque de France officials stay on for six years
and the six lay members are appointed for nine years.  Consequently, half the
board members can be replaced within  just four years.
12/  The Banque de France's first independent board consisted of a successful
financier (the head of an insurance company), a representative from  an industry
association (the head of the international standards testing  laboratory),  a financial
regulator (the chairman of the stock market watchdog),  a socialist politician
(presumably representing labor), an academic economist and an economic
journalist/commentator..111  In this vein, Persson  and Tabellini  (1992) devise  an incentive-compatible
contractual  approach  which can be used  to solve the inflation bias.
14/ Alternative  (tougher)  schemes  could be: (i) the IFB  determines  the entire
budget (its size and composition)  so that the fiscal process  is removed  from the
government's  hands;  or, my personal  choice, (ii) the IFB  determines  total revenues
and expenditures  (i.e., the total size of the budget  and  the deficit) and the
government  decides  only the composition  of spending  and taxation.References
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